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Introduction
Arranging a rank-order tournament between several agents, a principal usually wants to achieve two aims: First, she wants to induce incentives for the agents to work hard, second, she wants to identify the most able agent. The theoretical literature on risk taking in tournaments (Hvide 2002 , Hvide & Kristiansen 2003 , Yumoto 2003 , Kräkel & Sliwka 2004 indicates that the achievement of these aims is extremely jeopardized when the agents are able to choose strategies of different risk. The agents may prefer to play high risk strategies and, as a direct consequence, to choose inefficiently low efforts.
Moreover, the tournament's outcome would then be mainly influenced by luck or random components and, hence, would not entail much new information about the agents' abilities.
Summarizing, risk taking behavior in tournaments might have extremely negative consequences for the principal. It is therefore of great interest to explore how important risk taking is in practice. In this paper, we empirically address two questions. Do agents participating in rank-order tournaments make use of very risky strategies? If so, does risk taking pay off for the agents, that is, are risk taking agents more successful than non risk taking ones?
We examine data of German Major League Soccer. 1 The advantage of using soccer data is that soccer exactly represents the structure of a tournament, where agents may choose strategies of different risk. In our setting, the agents are the teams' coaches. formation. Most interestingly, we show that switching to a strategy of higher risk is less successful than maintaining the initial one. We, therefore, find evidence that risk taking does not only affect the dispersion of an outcome, but also its expectancy. This aspect is neglected in the previous empirical and theoretical literature.
The paper is organized as follows: We present two hypotheses in section 2. A description of our data is placed in section 3. In section 4, we present our main results.
Concluding remarks are offered in section 5.
Hypotheses
In German Major League Soccer (as in most other soccer leagues), a team winning a match receives three points, while a losing team receives no point. In case of a tie, both teams receive one point. The teams are ranked according to the overall points they have received. If some teams have same overall points, these teams are ranked according to the difference in goals scored and goals suffered. Hence, a coach mainly cares for points received by his team. Figure 1 therefore describes the incentive structure during a single match for a certain team.
On the x-axis, we measure the difference in goals scored by the considered team and its opponent. If the team is one goal down, it will not lose any points by suffering further goals. On the other hand, the team will receive additional points by scoring goals itself.
For instance, a team will get two more points (3 instead of 1), if it breaks a tie. The coach should then be likely to switch to a riskier strategy. If the considered team leads by one goal, the argumentation is contrary and the coach should be likely to switch to a less risky strategy. This argumentation is summarized in hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1. The coach of a team leading (being behind) during a match should
switch to a less risky (riskier) strategy.
Figure 1: Incentive structure of a soccer match
In sports like soccer, people often talk about so-called "six-point-matches". These are matches between "direct rivals", that is, matches, where teams having almost the same ranking compete. If a team wins such a match, it will not only receive 3 points, but also guarantee that its direct rival gets no point. The incentive structure in a six-point-match is described by figure 2. Starting from a tie, a team competing in a six-point-match has more to lose than a team competing in an ordinary three-point-match. (defender or midfielder replaced by forward, defender replaced by midfielder) and risk reducing substitutions (midfielder or forward replaced by defender, forward replaced by midfielder). A risk taking substitution usually increases the possibility to score a goal in a certain period, but also increases the probability to suffer one. We examine both the starting formations of the teams and the kind of substitutions. Besides, we know the scores at the moment of each substitution, the final score and the ranking of the team before the match. The data is available in the internet at www.kicker.de. Players are matched to tactical positions by Kicker -the main German soccer magazine -as well.
Examining 306 matches with two teams, we have got 612 observations. On average the teams consists of 3.5 defenders and 2.4 forwards at the beginning of a match. We observe 1682 substitutions during the whole season, whereby 24 percent can be defined as risk taking substitutions and 21 percent as risk reducing ones.
Results
First, we want to examine the effect of the current score on risk taking and risk reduction (hypothesis 1). We, therefore regress the goal difference -defined as the number of goals scored by the team minus goals scored by the opponent -on risk taking and risk reducing substitutions. Binary probit regressions provide evidence in support of hypothesis 1 (see Table 1 ). Indeed, the probability of risk taking (risk reducing) substitutions is decreasing (increasing) in the differences of goals. Coaches replace a more defensive player by a more offensive one, when their teams are behind. On the contrary, coaches want to reduce the probability of suffering a goal, when their teams are staying ahead.
The kind of substitution may also be affected by the ex ante probability to win the match. Usually it is a considerable advantage to play at home. 2 Additionally, teams at the top of the ranking are favorites against teams with weaker performance in the previous matches. Probably, favorites rather than underdogs will be up to risk taking substitutions. Hence, we expect a positive (negative) effect of a home match and a negative (positive) effect of the difference in the ranking -defined as the ranking of the club minus the ranking of the opponent -on risk taking (risk reducing) behavior of the coaches. In tendency, the results confirm these considerations. Second, we hypothesized a more defensive starting formation in matches against direct rivals in the overall ranking (hypothesis 2) because of the different incentive structure.
In order to examine this issue, we use the number of defenders and forwards in the starting formations as dependent variables in ordered probit regressions. The character of a match against a direct rival is measured with the absolute difference in the ranking, so that this variable has low values for matches against rivals. Hence, we expect a negative (positive) effect on the number of defenders (forwards). Tactical formations may also depend on the place of the match (home versus away match). Hypothesis 2 cannot be confirmed. The effects of the absolute difference in the ranking are not significant and the sign with respect to the number of forwards is even negative instead of positive (see Table 2 ). Obviously, the coaches do only concentrate on their own team and do not take into account the relative ranking to their opponent. Coaches choose to begin home matches with significant more forwards, though. At last, we want to evaluate the success of risk taking behavior in soccer matches. If a coach chooses a risk taking substitution -probably if his team is behind -he aims an advancement of the score and therefore, an advancement of received points. We measure success of a team in a particular match as the score advancement from the moment of the first substitution to the final whistle. It is possible that this measure is positive, but nevertheless a team looses a match. Therefore, we make use of an additional second measure: the advancement of received points, which is defined as the difference of actual points after a match minus hypothetical points due to the score at the moment of the first substitution. As mentioned above, a coach can undertake up to three substitutions during a match. We generate an overall measure of the coaches risk taking based on all observable substitutions. Forwards get the value 2, midfielder the value 1 and defender the value 0. We calculate the difference of the values of the new and the replaced player for each substitution. Then, the degree of risk taking is defined as the sum of these differences of all substitutions for a certain team and match. Hence, a high value determines a high level of risk taking and negative values coincide with risk reducing behavior. The distribution of the variables score advancement, point advancement and degree of risk taking are given in Table 3 . The variables score advancement and point advancement have an ordinal scale.
Evaluating the effect of risk taking behavior on success, we, therefore, use ordered probit regressions again. Home match and difference in ranking before the match again act as control variables. Table 4 reveals that risk taking behavior lead to a worsening of the score. Hence, the increase in the probability to suffer a goal outweighs the increased possibility to score an additional goal. As described in section 2, a team being behind has little to loose except for a worse goal difference, but can achieve a point advancement next to the score advancement. However, the degree of risk taking behavior does not lead to a point advancement, either. On the contrary, point advancement is also negatively associated with the degree of risk taking. Hence, avoiding offensive substitutions result in higher probabilities to catch up a handicap or break a tie. Probably, the coaches overestimate the advantages of risk taking on average.
In other words, they underestimate the chances of score and point advancements with their chosen tactical starting formation. Obviously, the disadvantages of risk taking dominate. Therefore, not only the distribution of possible outcomes is dispersed by risk taking in professional soccer, but also the expectancy is affected negatively. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we empirically analyzed the relevance of risk taking in tournaments.
Using data from German Major League Soccer, we found that risk taking matters.
Coaches of teams leading during a match switch to less risky strategies, while the opposite is true for coaches of teams being behind. Most interestingly, we demonstrated that switching to a riskier strategy for a coach is worse than maintaining the initial strategy in that it leads to a lower expected score and point advancement. This is quite surprising. One should expect that a team being one or more goals down should be more likely to achieve a point advancement, when it switches to riskier strategy. Obviously, an increase in risk not only enhances the variance of the outcome distribution, but also decreases its mean.
What do these results entail for the optimal organization of firms? Theoretical literature states that firms should not use tournaments in settings, where agents' efforts are a crucial issue and agents are able to play high-risk strategies. However, if agents´ efforts are less important, the decision of a firm, whether or not to arrange tournaments, should depend on the firm's objective function. We examined that the expectancy of the outcome is affected by risk taking as well. Firms that maximize aggregate performance might therefore be better off with avoiding tournaments and implementing different incentive schemes. On the contrary, in environments where the best performance is to be maximized -such as perhaps in R&D departments, where only a new invention matters -tournaments may perform better as an incentive device.
